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 Brute force techniques used in many fields of authentication process. Ftp 
servers, web servers and mail servers very often got threatened by attackers. 
Old technique for mail service brute force still working and it can be easily 
detected by special signature. Main sources of attacks were detected and 
separated by countries and time of the day. Bursts of attacks detected 
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In today’s world, information security has become a very crucial issue like never before. With 
unauthorized access to certain services, an attacker can cause significant financial damage to the victim. Any 
modern information resource [1],[2] may be subject to attack. So, the various seemingly minor attacks should 
not be overlooked. Such attacks include brute force attack with Ylmf-pc signature [3] against a mail server. 
 
 
2. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM 
With time, many mail server owners are faced with a situation where the server log file (an example 
is shown in Figure 1 is filled with lots of records about attempts to connect to the server from the user ylmf-
pc. 
As can be seen in the Figure 1, the server blocks connection from ylmf-pc, which sends wrong smtp 
ehlo/helo command [4]. Ylmf-pc is the name used during authentication on the server. Upon receipt of this 
command, the server checks whether the name sent matches with the IP address from where the command 
came, and if they don’t match, then it is most likely that person is an unscrupulous user. The server 
terminates or doesn’t terminate such connection depending on the server settings. The attack is aimed at 
obtaining the authentication password of an e-mail server via a brute force attack. If authentication is 
successful, the attacker gains access to the mail server account from where spam will be subsequently sent. It 
is widely believed that servers, whose security was breached using ylmf-pc queries, are one of the largest 
Cutwail/Pushdo botnets [5]. However, there is no reliable information that the attacking computers or 
compromised computers are part of this botnet [6]. 
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Figure 1. An example of the log-file 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, there is no cyclic pattern of queries, but it should be noted that 
activity peaks on weekends. At the same time, it should be remembered that the time of the attacker and not 
of the victim should be taken into account. These observations coincide with the patterns derived in [7]. On 
weekdays, when servers are busy sending out spam emails, less resources are allocated to the botnet for its 
hacking attempts on new servers. But during weekends when the spam effectiveness falls, the servers deploy 





Figure 2. Activity query from ylmf-pc 
 
 
There are various IP addresses from which ylmf-pc brute-force attack is carried out. Therefore, 
blocking connections by IP address will not fetch the proper result. Since IP addresses rarely change country, 
one can see which countries have the highest activity of ylmf-pc queries. Collected statistics showed that IP 
addresses from the United States, the Netherlands and France account for over half of the queries. The full 
picture of the percentage distribution of the number of queries from different countries is shown in Figure 3. 
The statistics was gathered over 100 days. A total of 192,858 queries from clients with ylmf-pc 
signature were recorded. The top 5 countries that sent the highest number of queries are presented in the 
Table 1. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of queries by country 
 
 
Table 1. Statistical results of attacker ip addresses 
IP address (country of location) Number of queries (percentage of the total number of queries) 
37.59.87.23(NL) 43,895 (22%) 
62.210.188.27(FR) 15,926 (8%) 
198.251.79.135(US) 8,155 (4%) 
212.225.165.70(ES) 7,237 (3%) 
46.29.254.244(US) 6,413 (3%) 
 
 
There were 599 unique IP addresses from which attacks were made. There was an average of 
1928.58 queries, and about 80 queries per hour. That is, an average of 1.3 queries per minute. Daytime 
queries (9:00 to 21:00) account for 59%, while night queries (21:00 to 09:00) take up the remaining 41%. At 
the same time, this distribution for each country does not match. Figure 4 shows the distribution for the top 3 





Figure 4. Distribution of queries (day/night) 
 
 
There are several approaches when it comes to protecting against this type of attack. One option is 
to block an IP address after several unsuccessful helo/ehlo authentication attempts. With this approach, you 
must not forget that connection attempts originate from multiple, dynamically allocated IP addresses, and that 
a blocked address may, after some time, be given to an innocent user. So the optimum ban duration should be 
chosen. Another option is to interrupt the query session while in the helo/ehlo query field of the ylmf-pc 
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signature. This option is more preferable because the server, in this case, doesn’t process the query, but rather 
gives a response that the query is incorrect, and immediately terminates the connection, thereby not 
informing the attacker about whether the data (username and password) sent by him were correct or not. 
Before establishing a connection, you may also want to check whether the IP address is in the list of infected 
IP addresses, for example, fail2ban. Another way to protect against this type of attack is to reconfigure the 
mail server to another port –ylmf-pc executes attack on standard SMTP port. More and more various ways of 




To summarize it all, it should be noted that despite the seeming harmlessness of ylmf-pc queries, 
loss of control over a mail server account, for example, an educational system [9] or even any functioning 
mail server, can lead to tragic consequences: your server will become part of the botnet due to sending of 
various kinds of spam from it [10] and later the IP address will be included by services in the list of spam 
addresses (DNSBL). 
The issue of password guessing is massive in nature. Despite the simplicity of this attack and 
methods of protection against it, ylmf-pc brute-force attack appears to be producing results, as this attack has 
been used for over five years now. This implies that its use has been successful on some servers. During the 
period under review, the top IP addresses in terms of number of attack attempts are IP addresses from the 
Netherlands and the United States. Both countries shared the first position with 44,000 ylmf-pc queries each 
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